STRATEGIC BALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE USA’S AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH ASIA STRATEGY:    IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY OF PAKISTAN AND PAKISTAN-US RELATIONS

Dr. G. M. Chaudhry

Policy, Governance and National Security Analyst

Parliamentary Council and Legislative Draftsman

ISLAMABAD

E-mail: drgmchaudhryg@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Strategic balance is an important aspect of international security studies. Maintaining strategic balance with neighbours and internationally ensures national security of any state. President Donald Trump’s Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia is an attempt to destabilize strategic balance in South Asian Region which hasa special strategic importance for Pakistan due to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and One Belt, One Road projects in SAR, Asia and Europe. Special importance is given to India in policy with a special role for reconstruction of Afghanistan which is alarming for Pakistan. Pakistan-US has rollercoaster relations based on realist approach particularly regarding the US national interests in the region. This policy has serious implications for national security of Pakistan and a serious blow to Pakistan-US relations forcing Pakistan to review its national security options in changing geo-strategic scenario by searching new partners for its national security and economic development.

Key words:    relations, national security, strategic balance, regional, implications, South Asia.

____________________

Introduction

Securitysimply means the absence of any threat. In case of any threat, there will be no security. Security is directly proportional to the level of threat as if there will be more threats, the security will be more vulnerable. If there will be nothreats there will be complete security. However, it is practically impossible to have a zero value of threat i.e. absolute security. Certainly, there will be less or more threat but there is a difference between perception and reality as these are completely psychological phenomena which cannot be measured with real arithmetical values. Security is an important aspect of the state behaviour which is based on presumptions with latent values instead of realities and patent values. In an anarchic international environment, the security is the pivotal to state priorities.

The USA is continuously reviewing its national security policies keeping in view changing national and international geo-strategic priorities. After the end of Cold War there was beginning of terrorism as an instrument by the states and non-state actors to achieve their objectives by planning in strategic terms. The US strategists are ambitious to ensure their successes throughout the world at any cost to ensure national security and the US interests internationally. The US national security strategies after the end of the Cold War are aggressive instead to maintain status quo to address the causes of frustration against the American people due to aggressive policies of the US administration. Due to this reason the US administrations are resorting to excessive use of their military power instead of addressing the psychological factors causing hatred against American people and the USA. There is also no doubt that the USA’s hegemonic ideas certainly require an aggressive strategy to turn the ideas into realities. However, there is a difference in thinking in a war-room and acting in a war-field. War is the strategy to control and overpower the enemy according to someone’s will (Carl von Clausewitz 1976:89).[1]National security dilemmas are leading to a hot or cold warwhich are the product of existential challenges and opportunities as well as errors in policy or strategy (Colin S. Gray 2009:7).[2]In this regard the US administration is guided by recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Thomas H. Kean et al. 2003)[3]suggesting use of all available means to eliminate and destroy terrorists and their organizationsto prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism particularly and to protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks generally. The US administration launched the War on Terrorism (WoT) to achieve those aggressive policy goals and objectives (Thomas H. Kean et al. 2003).[4]It was also pointed out that the USA is in an ironic position in its apogee of power (Dale C. Copeland 2000:39-60)[5] because any deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work and produce any result against leaders of rouge states who are more willing to take risks (Brian Bond 1996:20-26).[6]It was also concluded that traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy targeting innocents (Michael Howard 1999:129).[7]

In the above perspective and after constant failures to produce any victorious results as well as keeping in view experience of former Presidents after the 9/11 incident, President DonaldTrump on August 21, 2017, after a marathon deliberation process of his advisers, policy-makers and strategists in his Remarks on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia (SASA) said “our nation must seek an honourable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives…deserve a plan for victory…to fight and win.” (Donald John Trump 2017).[8] The Strategy clearly delineated for Afghanistan and South Asia while allowing a prominent role to India and deprecating the role of Pakistan in serious words. It also hurled an express warning to Pakistan for providing safe havens to terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose serious threats to the US interests in the region and beyond.

It is noteworthy that previously Pakistan was the most allied amongst the allies of the USA (Rajvir Singh 1985:213).[9]But there is no cavil to say that a sense of resentment and distrust of the USA pervades Pakistan due to impression that the USA benefited from Pakistan “like a used Kleenex” and discarded when the USA’s interests were served (DenixKux 2001:365).[10] Thisimpression has nowbecome deep-rooted as the US Strategy acted like a last straw on camel’s back. There was a severe reactionamongst the leaders, military and people of Pakistan on the Strategy. However, there is a wave of happiness in India as the India got better and recognized status than desired and expected. Jubilation in New Delhi is enough to dip the Pakistan-US relations to their lowest ebb.The statements of the US leaders and administration further deteriorated the level of misunderstanding as an impression was created that Pakistan will be sternly dealt with penal consequences in addition to military action in the terrorist havens located in Pakistan.

1. Interpreting Trump’s Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia

Neorealist approach is in action in the US Strategy. Neo-realism which is the reinterpretation of classical realism made it a more rigorous theory of international politics by application of general laws to explain state behaviour. Neorealism deals with structural characteristics of an international system of states instead of their component units. Here structure refers “ordering” or “arrangement” of the party of a system. In this theoretical system a state is the part of the international system of states which is being directly affected by different factors like economic actors and results of their actions. K. N. Waltz (1979) expounded this theory in his book “Theory of International Politics” (K.N. Waltz 1979)[11]. International system is the most important level for study of state behaviour and general laws can explain events in state affairs in their geo-strategic environment. He believes on two arguments, firstly, there is a need of a theory to understand international politics and secondly, it is the capability of a state in the international system which determines its cooperative behaviour. In this way, states are constantly guarding their interests in an anarchic system when the possibilities for international cooperation are logically lessin theoretical and practical terms. Thus, states always make efforts for more power instead of keeping a balance under the threat perception of their national security.

2. Balance of Power between Pakistan and India – The US Role

Jawaharlal Nehru, first Indian prime minister said, “…If India and Pakistan follow a contrary policy and are opposed to each other, they will obviously be neutralizing each other and cannot play that role, …This conflict and wasteful effort will wipe us out from the face of the earth (Jawaharlal Nehru 2010: 446).[12] Similarly, M. Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister also said, “Pakistan and India …if they stood together, could play in world affairs an almost decisive role.” (M. Zafrulla Khan 1976:8).[13]These were mere gestures of goodwill and good wishes as Jawaharlal Nehru while making a statement on All India Radio on June 3, 1947 said, “It may be that in this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise” (H.V. Hodson, 1985:315)[14] accepting the partition of British India only as a temporary necessity (S.M. Burke 1973:8)[15] as the Pakistan would collapse in a short time being not viable (AbulKalam 1960:185).[16] In this way, the first threat of war came from Gandhi, considered as the apostle of non-violence, on September 26, 1947, a few days after establishment of Pakistan while saying “If Pakistan persistently refuses to see its proved error, and continues to minimize it, the India Government would have to go to war against it” (Alan Campbell-Johnson 1976:206)[17]. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, first Governor-General of Pakistan thus complained by saying, “It is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on …that Pakistan is…merely a temporary madness and Pakistan will have to come into the Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son.” (Muhammad Ali Jinnah 1947)[18] In this way India had taken all steps to prove the Pakistan a failure to collapse as an independent and sovereign state. Pakistan was denied all its due rights in addition to forceful usurpation of the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jodhpur by sending Indian armed forces instead to allow their people or rulers to exercise their right of accession with their free will.Thus, India refused to resolve mutual problems peacefully and on the basis of principles of law and justice (Abdul Sattar 2013:37).[19] Pakistan believed that existence, sovereignty and security of Pakistan was not acceptable to India and it had become the basis of perception of insecurity for Pakistan forcing Pakistan to search for security in the form of friends, partners and allies. Then the realism in its modern context of neorealism was in action and Pakistan’s perception of insecurity forced it to search for balancing factors in economic, political and security terms. It was difficult to create a balance between two unequal states.Therefore, Pakistan was compelled to resort to all available options for its national security and west was the first option.

At the time of establishment of Pakistan there was nothing except a geostrategic location at the junction of South, Central and West Asia. Mounbatten before the establishment of Pakistan said that the American object in India was to capture all the markets to step in and take the place of the British with ultimate aim to get bases in India for use against Russia and in fact, backed by the British and American arms and techniques Pakistan would in no while have armed forces immensely superior to that of Hindustan with Karachi to become big naval and air base (Stanley Wolpert 1996:392).[20] Due to this reason also during the Cold War, Pakistan’s geostrategic significance played role of a frontline ally of the West against the Communist bloc, particularly the Soviet Union (Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri 2015:143).[21]Owing to Pakistan’s security concerns, Pakistan entered into a series of bilateral and multilateral relationships prompting intricate balancing acts and diplomatic manoeuvring by the countries intended to safeguard their national interests in the region and the USA was the first to step in strategic relationship with Pakistan ((Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri 2015:143).[22]

In the beginning even the USA refused to provide financial assistance worth two billion dollars to Pakistan for economic development and supplies of armaments and ammunition as well as facilities to train its armed personnel (K. Arif 1984:5).[23]It was the first effort on the part of Pakistan to create a balance of power with the help of much need economic and military assistance to the nascent state immediately after two months of its emergence. The USArefused to provide assistance of such quantum politely with assertion to give sympathetic consideration to emergency needs of reasonable proportions (Rashmi Jain 2007:7).[24] The non-aligned role of India during the Korean War with a particular tilt towards Communist bloc disappointed the US administration (K.M. Panikkar 1954).[25]The US threat perception of expansion of communism forced the US policy-makers to cooperate with Pakistan and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific visited Pakistan and also to visit Khyber Pass and on his return Radford declared that Pakistan enjoyed a strategic position and had an important role to play in the world to fight against Communism (Dawn 1952).[26]This was the starting point about convergence of the US interests with Pakistan (Hafeez Malik 2009:93).[27]

President Eisenhowerappointed John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State who was the staunch supporter of defence pacts and alliances. Dulles visited Pakistan and while briefing on his visit said that Pakistan occupies a strategic location (Rashmi Jain 2007:25)[28] and is the largest of the Moslem nations with strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people to make them a dependable bulwark against Communism (Rashmi Jain 2007: 25)[29] with realization for a role for Pakistan in a common front against the Communism as the Pakistan will make available manpower, resources and strategic facilities for mutual defence effort with the West (Rashmi Jain 2007: 26).[30] All this culminated into a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the United States on May 19, 1954 (Dawn 1954).[31]

Pakistan also actively participated in South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty concluded at Manila on the September 8, 1954, with Thailand, the Philippines, the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand as its member states, which was also known as the Manila Pact.Thereafter, Turkey and Iraq laid the foundation of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation i.e. Baghdad Pact, in February 24, 1955, which was also known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

Pakistan also concluded the Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement, 1954, with the USA wherein the USA formally made concrete commitments to support Pakistan’s defence. Pakistan enhanced its defence capabilities and was successfully able to create a balance of power against India with superior arms and defence technology of the USA and its allies. There was a great cost of all that as at the same time the USSR had become worst enemy of Pakistan and signed a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR in 1971 which caused loss to territorial sovereignty of Pakistan when East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan with active assistance of the USSR by India. However, none of Western Allies of Pakistan including the USA turned up to aid and assist Pakistan instead resorted to neutrality causing height of frustration to Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan learnt a bitter lesson and aspired for creating a balance against India with its own resources and the only option left with Pakistan was the nuclear weapons as the Pakistan cannot compete with the traditional Indian military power due to its inadequacy (Abdul Sattar 2013:161).[32] India in the meantime also exploded its nuclear devices in 1974 in Pokhran declaring it “peaceful” (Dr. SmiullahKoreshi 2012:271).[33]

During the period from 1972 to 1979, Pakistan-US relations remained at the lowest ebb and the US administration imposed military and economic sanctions against Pakistan due to Pakistan’s efforts for acquisition of nuclear technology. Bhutto was the Prime Minister of Pakistan who was considered as anti-American although he tried to realize the US administration, “‘I’m not-anti-American” (F.S. Aijazuddin 2010: 125).[34] Bhutto also quit the Commonwealth due to Britain’s role regarding Bangladesh. Post-Bangladesh relations with India were also apparently settled but the element of duress remained prominent during the whole process.

Bhutto’s clash with the US occurred due to acquisition and pursuing ambition of nuclear technology as the only viable option for Pakistan (Shirin Tahir-Kheli 1982:62)[35] after Indian nuclear explosions.

Carter administration also ignored the Pakistan even the Secretary of State Warren Christopher in New Delhi in July, 1977, said that Washington expected India to play a “leading role in South Asia” which had an impact of declaration of abandonment of Pakistan and complete isolation. However, on December 26, 1979, the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan on the pretext of an invitation from HafeezUllah Amin but later on installed BabrakKarmal as the President of Afghanistan. The entire scenario of Pakistan-US relations changed within minutes as the US NSC Adviser ZbigniewBrezezinski had recommended the President to review policy towards Pakistan (Steve Coll 2004).[36]President Reagan changed the US policy towards Pakistan to its entirety. Arms, military and economic assistance flowed to Pakistan worth hundreds of millions of dollars (K. Arif 1984:460-461).[37] This was the period of extreme cooperation and collaboration between the Pakistan and the US governments in all matters which resulting in ultimate collapse of the USSR after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a result of Geneva Accords in April 14, 1988, with the Soviet loss of over 13,000 soldiers, more than 35,000 injured and financial loss of about 100 billion rubles.The Soviet Union completed withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, ten months after the Geneva Accords (Riaz M. Khan 1992:39).[38] Soviets spent about US$ 5-6 billion a year on the Afghan War exhausting the Soviet economy (Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli 1998:51)[39]. It was also a classic example of “imperial over-stretch” (Paul Kennedy 1989:94)[40] and misadventure.

It was again a time for reversal of the US policy towards Pakistan as a matter of routine. Season of economic and military sanctions was in full swing coercing Pakistan to face brunt of civil war in Afghanistan as well as brunt of activities of Jihadis (religious fighters), terrorist groups and religious organizations claiming their share in the booty of Afghanistan. There was a complete instability in Afghanistan as the government saddled in Kabul was unable to control the affairs of the country being unrepresentative. There was a rise of another force of student militia led by Mullah Omar, a prayer leader. The rise of Taliban was also the rise of their financial mentor Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national, having hatred towards the USA and targeting the US citizens and interests in different countries of the world including Kenya and Tanzania and the US intelligence agencies and forces hunting for his head or life at any cost.The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had already condemned such terrorist attacks with directions to all states to take effective steps for the prevention of terrorist attacks and prosecution of the culprits wherever they are found. Pakistan was equal sufferer of such terrorist attacks with loss of lives and precious properties of innocent people and the state.

On May 11 and 13, 1998, India again conducted multiple nuclear tests with hurling of threats from Indian leaders towards Pakistan. Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani boasting for shifting of balance of power in the region. Pakistan was left with no choice except to respond in the same manner. Thus, on May 28 and 30, 1998, Pakistan also detonated its nuclear weapons which were more sophisticated than India being miniature in their size which was the settlement of the score with India and regaining the balance of power between Pakistan and India in their race of strategic weapons. It was unleashing of enhancement of already going on economic and military sanctions on Pakistan by the US administration. This was the attitude of the US administration towards its most allied ally in the past. However, it was a minimum credible deterrence to ensure national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan in the South Asian Region at par with India. It also proved true that Pakistani’s will eat grass but will make atomic bomb as asserted by Bhutto after first Indian nuclear explosions in July, 1974 (Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan 2012:19).[41] Pakistan was then a nuclear weapon state but also facing extreme level of isolation as it was during the period from 1972 to 1979, which continued till the incident of 9/11 in the USA.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, although burst the myth of the US might but at the same time blown down the US military and economic sanctions against Pakistan as it was the necessity of the US interests. It was practically impossible for the US to carryon any military action in Afghanistan without the active support and assistance of Pakistan as all the roads to a successful action in Afghanistan go through Pakistan. The US President George W. Bush spoke for a “monumental struggle of good versus evil” (President George W. Bush 2001)[42] with expectation of full cooperation from Pakistan in the War on Terrorism. The US administration declared it a time for self-defence with a resolve to punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks but also those who harboured them (Thomas H. Kean 2003:330).[43] Pakistan without any condition or reservation extended full cooperation and support to the USA in its War on Terrorism since the launch of an attack on Afghanistan on October 6, 2001, by the US-led coalition although the people of Pakistan sharply reacted against such actions and unconditional support.

By participation in the US War on Terrorism, Pakistan again resumed the role as a “frontline State” in the US War on Terrorism and consequently the US administration relaxed all military and economic sanctions against the Pakistan. Pakistan was provided economic and military assistance worth billions of dollars in addition to intelligence sharing and collective operations against the terrorists in different parts of Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan since then. However, there were ups and downs during this relationship due to frustrations and disenchantments on the part of both parties. But the US administration and forces miserably failed to establish order in Afghanistan and constantly blamed Pakistan for its failures without minutely analyzing different factors for its own failures.

In the backdrop of frustrations and distrust, the President Donald John Trump during his election campaign and after coming into power announced that the US will review its policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan to ensure a complete victory of the US in Afghanistan.

President Donald John Trump on August 21, 2017, announced his Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia[44]which is mainly against Pakistan and giving key role to India in Afghanistan particularly and in the region generally.

The US Strategy expressly stated for broader role of India at the cost of Pakistan as there will be no role for Pakistan in Afghanistan in future. Thus, it is strategic shift in favour of India which is badly going to disturb strategic balance in the South Asia and between Pakistan and India in near future having deeper implications for national security of Pakistan and also introducing an impasse in Pakistan-US relations.

3. Impact of the US Strategy on Pakistan-India Balance of Power

There is no conventional balance of power between Pakistan and India in the region and Pakistan was always in search of allies and partners to maintain a balance of power. The USA was playing a role of strategic balancer against India although during the non-aligned period the USA was also having priority relations with India being the largest democracy in the world as well as against China. Pakistan and India, being the major powers in the South Asian Region, are surviving with tenuous relations since 1947 (Ganguly 2001:52).[45]Both the states are making efforts to maintain balance of power, resolve interstate disputes and control nuclear rivalry (S.K. Khatri 1987:23-29).[46] Thus, the South Asia remained a hotbed of hostilities between historic arch rivals Pakistan and India with armed conflicts between them (Monika Barthwal-Datta 2012:25).[47]The conventional balance of power is always in favour of India as the India keeping a large army equipped with the latest weaponry (Navniit Gandhi 2010:16)[48] to ensure its national security. However, the US Strategy has further tilted the balance of power in favour of India with clear declaration by Trump for a strategic partnership with India.Pakistan left with no option except to react sharply over the US strategic policy in Afghanistan and the South Asia. Even before the US Strategy, India was following an aggressive policy with threats and warlike euphoria with threats to launch aggressive actions in Pakistan (Anwar Iqbal 2017).[49] There is dangerous impact on balance of strategic power between India and Pakistan after the USA announced a broader role for India in Afghanistan declaring it as Afghanistan’s ‘most reliable’ partner while sharing increased burden for Afghanistan (The News 2017).[50]

4. Afghanistan and Pakistan Relations after the US Strategy

There is history of constrained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan due to hatred of non-pashtune (non-Pashto-speaking) population of Afghanistan which believes that Pakistan supports domination of pashtune population in Afghanistan. Since the establishment of Pakistan there are constrained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan although Pakistan always helped Afghanistan during different emergencies and strategic eventualities. Presently, the armed confrontation in Afghanistan is main destabilizing factor in the South Asia as stated by Vladimir Potapenko, Deputy Secretary-General, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (ObaidAbrar Khan 2017).[51] Thus, further deterioration in Pakistan and Afghanistan relations after the US SASA is seen and a logical outcome as there is further fragmentation in political thinking in Afghanistan (Ahmad Hassan 2017)[52] as it is very difficult for Afghanistan to survive economically without cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan relations will further worsen after Indian role as a strategic partner of the USA in its War on Terrorism in Afghanistan against the Muslim Jihadists by using its armed forces at a limited level, directly or indirectly, in collaboration with the CENTCOM armed forces[53]as the India is using its experience of suppression of Muslims in the Indian Occupied Kashmir with the assumption that same jihadists may support Muslims in the Indian Occupied Kashmir. Thus, after this coincidence of objective and purpose the just stance of Pakistan about the Indian Occupied Kashmir will be damaged.

5. Strengthening of Indian Interests in Afghanistan

The US Strategy has openly declared enhanced role of India in Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan. It is the result of only short-sightedness of the US policy-makers otherwise it is practically impossible to assert for such role of India in Afghanistan when India is also facing similar alienation in Afghanistan due to socio-cultural and religious basis which are unbridgeable gulfs between India and Afghanistan. The US Strategy is a clandestine effort to encircle Pakistan and reduce its strategic role in the South Asia. Indian presence in Afghanistan is being promoted and sponsored in Afghanistan as India did not want spread of radical Islam in the region (John Schmidt 2011:224)[54] and in this way there is common agenda of the USA and India in Afghanistan (Henry Kissinger 2009)[55] which is against the interest of Pakistan strategically, politically and socially. Russia remained India’s time-tested friend (Anil Bhat 2014:110)[56] but with the strategic partnership with the USA, the India is willing to tow the US line due to its strategic benefits in Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics even at the cost of its Russian relations. Pakistan figures nowhere in Indian foreign policy due to Indian ambitions of a regional power whereas it is a great fallacy as India will never be even a power unless there is an amicable resolution of all outstanding issues and problems with Pakistan including the dispute of Indian Occupied Kashmir. India believes on Kautilyan realist strategy in which there is no settlement with the designated natural enemy (Anil Bhat 2014:102)[57] and Pakistan is the same “natural enemy” of India in the South Asian Region as India cannot think of aggression against China.

6. Indian-Afghanistan Cooperation against Pakistan

There is no reason to presume that the ultimate result of the US Strategy will be cooperation between India and Afghanistan in collaboration with the USA to contain the Pakistan compelling Pakistan to seek assistance from other economic powers like China and Russia which are equally threatened and scared due to the US activities and role in Afghanistan. There is also an India-Afghanistan Treaty of Defence Cooperation which is also ultimately against the Pakistan and China to safeguard the US economic and strategic interest in the South Asian Region. Pakistan’s national security agencies believes all threats to the national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan emanating from India till the solution of all issues and problems between Pakistan and India which is practically impossible due to attitude of India. However, India believes that there will be no peace until there is a fundamental change in Pakistan’s defined policy i.e. forgetting the Indian Occupied Kashmir and other hardcore and old issues.[58] Therefore, the US Strategy is making Indian policy assertions and thinking more recalcitrant instead of settling unresolved issues with Pakistan.

7. Pakistan’s Threat Perception and Search of Balancing Factors

Pakistan is always surviving under the threat perception forcing Pakistan to make all out efforts for maintaining balance of power against India. Thus, after the US Strategy there is enhanced threat to national security of Pakistan requiring a credible deterrence and alliance relationship to deter possible hegemonic and evil designs of Pakistan-Afghanistan-the USA against the encircling of Pakistan. Pakistan’s “Strategic Defiance” (Brian Cloughley 1999:309-313)[59] is the most effective tool against the India during cold peace as the strategic assets (Gautam Das 2016:59-60).[60]The level of Pakistan’s threat perception is increasing with Indian increase of strategic power and in such circumstances Pakistan’s quest for partners and allies for its national security will remain non-stop. Indian development of defence industry with the aim of “Make in India” with a huge Defence Industrial Base (DIB) in addition to world’s largest importer of major weapons having about 15% of global share during the years 2010-2014 whereas Pakistan has no so much resources to create a parity or equation in defence spending(Laxman Kumar Behera 2016:1).[61]Ever increasing difference in balance of power enhanced threat to national security of Pakistan. Certainly, Pakistan cannot achieve this balance of power alone but with balancing factors like friends, allies and partners in international relations with common strategic interests.

8. Implication on National Security of Pakistan

Pakistan is having problems of national security and territorial integrity due to Indian and Afghan claims on Pakistan’s territories.Indians clearly believe that military power is the ultimate instrument of national power (ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria 2014:1)[62] although the concept of national security is broader in its perspective.India always threatened with conventional war with Pakistan (ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria 2014:174)[63] as Indians believed that Pakistan cannot match Indian power and strategic resources in conventional warfare except the best option of nuclear weapons in possession of Pakistan. India since its establishment considered Afghanistan vital for it due to civilization’s contacts and security interests so that India could not be destabilized by using Afghanistan against it due to the Muslim factor. Similarly, Pakistan is also concerned as India may destabilize Pakistan by breeding nationalist and internal conflicts in different parts of Pakistan and particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria 2014:174).[64] The declared policy guidelines in the US Strategy are meant to exploit all such factors which are not acceptable to Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s concerns are well-founded after the announcement of the US Strategy which has also caused jubilation in Indian circles in Washington, D.C., and in the capital of India. However, policies may get move the ground realities but ground realities have their own dynamism and the US administration and policy-makers should not be so much happy that Afghanistan will be peacefully in their lap as external polices not consistent with ground realities are not so prune to produce desired results. In any way, the new form of the USA-India partnership in Afghanistan will have deep-rooted implications for national security of Pakistan.

9. Conclusion

The United States’ strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia has threatened the strategic balance in the South Asian Region having serious implications for national security and territorial sovereignty of Pakistan ignoring history of Pakistan-US relations. The US-Indian relations in their present perspective are a cause of concern for Pakistan and alienating Pakistan from the USA in its future strategic relationship. Pakistan is in search of new allies and partners in the world and in the Asia particularly for its national security being the best option. The shift in the US policy in Afghanistan will also compel Russia and China to review their policies towards Afghanistan and India as the US imperial and hegemonic strategies are in action to outweigh economic priorities of China particularly and the Russian role in the emerging Asia generally. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in the South Asian Region and One Belt One Road initiative provided gigantic opportunities of economic cooperation, growth and development in the South Asian Region as well as in the Asia and Europe which are considered a threat to national interests of the USA in the region and the Asia. Therefore, it is an awaking call for Pakistan, China and the Russia as the old strategist is in action with new strategies in the South Asian Region and the Asia to create a new strategic balance of power from the existing balance of power.

__________________

Author

Dr. G. Chaudhry, Policy, Governance and National Security Analyst, Parliamentary Council and Legislative Draftsman. He is based in Islamabad and heading a Research and Consultancy Firm namely Chaudhry and Chaudhry Associates, Islamabad. He is the author of more than two dozen Books in the field of Law, Legislative Drafting and Process in Pakistan, Intellectual Property Rights, Military Laws and Constitution of Pakistan in addition to a collection ofessays on Law, Justice, Human Rights and Legal System. He also worked as Legislative Adviser/Draftsman in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights and participated in drafting of hundreds of laws.His books titled “Practical Approach to Legislative Drafting” and “Legislative Process in Pakistan”are liketext-books in the field of legislative drafting and law-making process and working of Parliament in Pakistan. “Essays on Law, Justice, Human Rights and Legal System” is a collection of essays on different topics as apparent from the title.Presently, he is heading a firm which is providing consultancy services and dealing with matters relating to Law, Governance, Management, Legislative and Parliamentary Drafting and Counselship in addition to delivering lectures as a Visiting Faculty Member in different Colleges and Universities.

____________________

References

 

“India Afghanist’s ‘most reliable’ partner: Pentagon”, The News, Islamabad, December 18, 2017.

Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 37, 161.

AbulKalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1960), pp. 185, 187 and 242.

Ahmad Hassan, Trump’s Afghan policy adds to Kabul woes,” The News, Islamabad, August 27, 2017.

Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 206.

Anil Bhat, ed., “Challenges of Indian Foreign Policy,”,Sudhir Singh, Modi’s Blueprint for India: Policy, Governance and Emerging Challenges (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), pp. 102-104, 110.

Anwar Iqbal, “India may launch aggressive actions in Pakistan: US spies,” Dawn, Islamabad, May 25, 2017.

Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 20-26.

Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 309-313.

Brigadier (Retd.) Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2012), ch. 4 and 19.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

Colin S. Gray, National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), p. 7.

Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp 39-60.

Dawn, May 20, 1954.

Dawn, November 13, 1952.

DenixKux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore, MA: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 365.

Donald John Trump, President of the USA, Remarks on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia on the August 21, 2017, Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

Dr. SmiullahKoreshi, Pakistan in the Era of Turbulent Diplomacy (Karachi: Paramount Publishing Enterprise, 2012), p. 271.

F.S. Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 125.

Gautam Das, Securing India’s Borders: Challenges and Policy Options (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), pp.59-60.

H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985), p. 315.

Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 93.

Henry Kissinger, “Deployments and Diplomacy,” Daily Beast, October 2, 2009.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, II, (New Delhi, 2010), p. 446.

John Schmidt, The Unraveling (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 2011), p. 224.

461. Arif, “Memorandum of the Government of Pakistan to US State Department on its requirements of financial and military assistance,” October, 1947, America-Pakistan Relations: Documents, Vol. I (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), p. 5, 460-461.
462. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chs. 5 and 6.

K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to the USA, “Middle Ground Between America and Russia: An Indian View,” Foreign Affairs, Jan, 1954.

Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 95, 143.

Laxman Kumar Behera, Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), pp.1-17.

8. Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Relations (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 8.

Michael Howard, When are Wars Decisive?” Survival 41 (Spring 1999), p. 129.

Monika Barthwal-Datta, Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: Securitization Theory and the Role of Non-state Actors (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), p. 25.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Governor-General, Statesman, October 25, 1947.

Myra MacDonald, Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War (Haryana, India: Penguin-Viking, 2017), p. 170.

Navniit Gandhi, National Security: Emerging Dimensions and Threats (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010), p. 16.

ObaidAbrar Khan, “Armed confrontation in Afghanistan is main destablising factor in South Asia,” The News, Islamabad, December 16, 2017.

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1989), pp. 94-180.

President George W. Bush’s Statement on September 12, 2001.

Rajvir Singh, U.S.-Pakistan and India: Strategic Relations (Allahabad, India: Chugh Publications, 1985), p. 213.

Rashmi Jain, ed., “US response to Pakistan’s request of $2 billion for military and financial aid,”,The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), p. 7, 25, 26.

Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 39-120.

43. Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp-52-65 and R.G.C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 31-43.

S.K. Khatri, ed., Regional Security in South Asia (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, 1987), pp. 23-29.

S.M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 8.

ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria, eds., “Afghanistan: India’s Strategic and Security Concerns,” ArpitaBasu Roy, India’s National Security in the 21^st Century (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), pp. 1-7, 170, 174-175.

Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States: Breaking with the Past (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1998), p. 51.

Shirin Tahir-Kheli,The United States and Pakistan – The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 62.

Steve Coll, “This Ghost War: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden,” quoted in Dawn, Islamabad, November 19, 2004.

Thomas H. Kean, Chair et al., The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 330, 361-398.

Wolpert, Stanley, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 392.

[1]Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

[2]Colin S. Gray, National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), p. 7.

[3]Thomas H. Kean, Chair, et al., The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), pp. 361-398.

[4]The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 363.

[5]Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp 39-60.

[6]Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 20-26.

[7]Michael Howard, When are Wars Decisive?” Survival 41 (Spring 1999), p. 129.

[8]Donald John Trump, President of the USA, Remarks on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia on the August 21, 2017, Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

[9]Rajvir Singh, U.S.-Pakistan and India: Strategic Relations (Allahabad, India: Chugh Publications, 1985), p. 213.

[10]DenixKux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore, MA: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 365.

[11]K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chs. 5 and 6.

[12]Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, II, (New Delhi, 2010), p. 446.

[13]M. Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Relations (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 8.

[14]H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985), p. 315.

[15]S.M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 8.

[16]AbulKalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1960), pp. 185, 187 and 242.

[17]Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 206.

[18] Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Governor-General, Statesman, October 25, 1947.

[19]Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 37.

[20]Wolpert, Stanley, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 392.

[21]Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 143.

[22]Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, p. 95.

[23]K. Arif, “Memorandum of the Government of Pakistan to US State Department on its requirements of financial and military assistance,” October, 1947, America-Pakistan Relations: Documents, Vol. I (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), p. 5.

[24]Rashmi Jain, ed., “US response to Pakistan’s request of $2 billion for military and financial aid,”,The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), p. 7.

[25] K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to the USA, “Middle Ground Between America and Russia: An Indian View,” Foreign Affairs, Jan, 1954.

[26]Dawn, November 13, 1952.

[27]Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 93.

[28]Rashmi Jain, ed., Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, June 1, 1953, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), p. 25.

[29]Rashmi Jain, ed., Testimony by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the Executive Session of the Senate CFR, June 3, 1953, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), p. 25.

[30]Rashmi Jain, ed., NSC 5409: “United States Policy Towards South Asia,” February 19, 1954, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), p. 26.

[31]Dawn, May 20, 1954.

[32]Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 161.

[33]Dr. SmiullahKoreshi, Pakistan in the Era of Turbulent Diplomacy (Karachi: Paramount Publishing Enterprise, 2012), p. 271.

[34]F.S. Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 125.

[35]Shirin Tahir-Kheli,The United States and Pakistan – The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 62.

[36]Steve Coll, “This Ghost War: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden,” quoted in Dawn, Islamabad, November 19, 2004.

[37]K. Arif, “Statement by Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology Buckley in the hearings before the Sub-Committee of the House CFA on Security and Economic Assistance to Paksitan,”, November 17, 1981, America-Pakistan Relations: Documents, Vol. I, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), pp. 460-461.

[38]Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 39-120.

[39] Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States: Breaking with the Past (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1998), p. 51.

[40]Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1989), pp. 94-180.

[41]Brigadier (Retd.) Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2012), ch. 4 and 19.

[42]President George W. Bush’s Statement on September 12, 2001.

[43]Thomas H. Kean, Chair, statement of President, George W. Bush, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 330.

[44]Donald John Trump, President of the USA, Remarks on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia on the August 21, 2017, Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

[45]S. Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp-52-65  and R.G.C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 31-43.

[46]S.K. Khatri, ed., Regional Security in South Asia (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, 1987), pp. 23-29.

[47]Monika Barthwal-Datta, Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: Securitization Theory and the Role of Non-state Actors (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), p. 25.

[48]Navniit Gandhi, National Security: Emerging Dimensions and Threats (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010), p. 16.

[49]Anwar Iqbal, “India may launch aggressive actions in Pakistan: US spies,” Dawn, Islamabad, May 25, 2017.

[50]“India Afghanist’s ‘most reliable’ partner: Pentagon”, The News, Islamabad, December 18, 2017.

[51]ObaidAbrar Khan, “Armed confrontation in Afghanistan is main destablising factor in South Asia,” The News, Islamabad, December 16, 2017.

[52]Ahmad Hassan, Trump’s Afghan policy adds to Kabul woes,” The News, Islamabad, August 27, 2017.

[53]Zahoor Khan Marwat, “The Indian connections in Afghanistan,” The News, Islamabad, December 21, 2017.

[54]John Schmidt, The Unraveling (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 2011), p. 224.

[55]Henry Kissinger, “Deployments and Diplomacy,” Daily Beast, October 2, 2009.

[56]Anil Bhat, ed., “What Should be Modi’s Foreign Policy,”, Pankaj Jha, Modi’s Blueprint for India: Policy, Governance and Emerging Challenges (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), p. 110.

[57]Anil Bhat, ed., “Challenges of Indian Foreign Policy,”,Sudhir Singh, Modi’s Blueprint for India: Policy, Governance and Emerging Challenges (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), pp. 102-104.

[58]Myra MacDonald, Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War (Haryana, India: Penguin-Viking, 2017), p. 170.

[59]Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 309-313.

[60]Gautam Das, Securing India’s Borders: Challenges and Policy Options (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), pp.59-60.

[61]Laxman Kumar Behera, Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), pp.1-17.

[62]ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria, eds., “The Essence of Indian National Security,” Jisjit Singh, India’s National Security in the 21^st Century (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), pp. 1-7.

[63]ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria, eds., “Understanding Pakistan’s Strategy,” Shalini Chawla, India’s National Security in the 21^st Century (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), pp. 174-175, 170.

[64]ShikharAdhikari and Sanjeev Bhadauria, eds., “Afghanistan: India’s Strategic and Security Concerns,” ArpitaBasu Roy, India’s National Security in the 21^st Century (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), pp. 233-243.